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THE FAILED REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR ANIMAL IMPORTS INTO THE
UNITED STATES – AND HOW TO FIX IT
PETER T. JENKINS, Defenders Of Wildlife, Washington, D.C., USA
Abstract: This paper provides a synopsis of the Defenders of Wildlife report entitled Broken Screens: The
Regulation of Live Animal Imports in the United States, released in August 2007. That report assessed the
complex federal system for regulating live wild animal imports as applied to the 2,241 non-native species that
were identified in United States Fish and Wildlife Service records as being imported between 2000 and 2004,
inclusive. The report describes the “coarse risk screening” conducted for those species by searching the
scientific literature and United States and international databases. If one or more reliable sources indicated a
species was known or predicted to be invasive, pose a disease risk, or otherwise be harmful, in the United
States or elsewhere, the species was labeled “potentially risky.” Due to the hundreds of potentially risky
species being imported with no-risk screening by federal officials, the report concludes the United States’
regulatory system provides a low level of protection to the nation. Absent major policy reforms, some of the
potentially risky, imported animals will escape or be released and form invasive wild populations or cause
disease outbreaks. Eleven policy recommendations are offered to reduce these risks to more tolerable levels.
Key Words: animals, disease, federal regulations, imports, invasive species, laws, non-native, risk, screening.
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major policy reforms, some of the potentially risky
non-native animals imported into this country will
escape or be released and establish invasive wild
populations or cause disease outbreaks.
Recognizing the failings of the regulatory
system and the lack of data necessary to understand
and fix the broken screens at the national borders,
Defenders of Wildlife (herein after, Defenders)
prepared an unprecedented study to: (1) describe
the full scope of the trade -- what non-native
species are being imported and in what cumulative
quantities, (2) assess the risks of the trade -- the
impacts these animals are having or could have on
native species, U.S. lands and waters, and on
human health, (3) examine the broken screens -- the
federal system for regulating this trade, and detail
their weaknesses and inconsistencies, and (4) make
policy recommendations based on these findings.
The Defenders’ study, Broken Screens: The
Regulation of Live Animal Imports in the United
States, was released in August, 2007 (Defenders of
Wildlife 2007). The report and extensive
supporting information are available online at:
www.defenders.org/animalimports. This paper is a
synopsis of that fully-referenced report.

INTRODUCTION
The United States (US) is the world’s largest
importer of live wild animals, receiving hundreds
of millions each year, most destined for the pet and
aquarium trade, some for zoos, research labs, and
specialty food markets. The declared wholesale
value of these imports from 2000 to 2004 was more
than one-half billion dollars, but this lucrative
import industry is a risky business. Inevitably,
some of the animals escape or, no longer wanted,
are let go. Unchecked by natural controls such as
predators and pathogens found in their native
ranges, these species can spread and cause serious
environmental, health, and economic problems.
Left unchecked by the federal agencies with
regulatory authority over this trade, potentially
risky species continually enter the US.
Remarkably, none of these federal agencies do
comprehensive risk screening of these species
before they are allowed into the US. Moreover, the
species in trade are often not adequately
documented in public records. Like a set of “broken
screens,” the complex federal system for regulating
live, wild animal imports is ineffective at keeping
out harmful or potentially harmful, species. Absent

85

SCOPE AND RISKS OF THE LIVE WILD
ANIMAL TRADE

IMPACTS ON ENVIRONMENT AND
HEALTH

Defenders reviewed summaries of the 20002004 records kept by the US Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) agents at ports of entry and gathered
information never before collated, including species
names for the 2,241 species of non-native, wild
animals legally imported to the US. Working with
the Consortium for Conservation Medicine (CCM)
and the World Conservation Union (IUCN)
Invasive Species Specialist Group (ISSG),
Defenders coarsely screened all these species for
potential risks by searching the scientific literature
and online databases and canvassing recognized
invasive species experts. If one or more of these
reliable sources indicated a species was known or
predicted to be invasive or harmful in the US or
elsewhere, the species was labeled potentially risky.
According to the readily accessible scientific
evidence gathered by Defenders and the ISSG, 302
of the 2,241 animal species imported to the US, 13
percent, were classified as potentially risky (Table
1). Sixteen percent of vertebrates were classified as
potentially risky – mostly birds, fish and mammals.
Although these species primarily presented as
invasive risk, human and non-livestock disease
risks also were prevalent. Only 3 percent of the
identified invertebrates were tagged potentially
risky, but this group of animals is relatively
unstudied compared to vertebrates.

Invasive, non-native species can eat, outcompete, parasitize, and transmit diseases to native
wildlife. They also can alter the physical
environment, modifying or destroying habitat
important to native wildlife. Particularly on islands
and in isolated lakes and springs, invaders have
done extensive environmental damage. In Hawaii,
for example, the egg-eating Indian mongoose
(Herpestes javanicus) has driven rare native birds
toward extinction. Indeed, invasive species are a
commonly cited contributing factor in listings
under the federal Endangered Species Act.
Hundreds of invasive species, including at least 26
considered by experts to be of “high impact,” are
already established in the US. Several more,
including Burmese pythons (Python molarus
bivittatus) in the Florida Everglades, red lionfish
(Pterois volitans) in the western Atlantic and
suckermouth catfish (Hypostomus plecostomus) in
the waters of the South, are gaining a foothold.
Many other likely invaders lurk among the animals
currently in trade. Imported animals can also carry
infectious pathogens and harmful parasites.
Although the US is the top market for live
animal imports, the federal government does not
require most imported animals (with the exception
of commercially-imported birds, livestock, and a

Table 1. Proportion of identified non-native animal species imported into the US with
annotations for potential invasiveness or disease risk, 2000-2004.
Taxonomic Group
Total Imported
Non-native
Proportion of NonNon-native Species
Species with
native Species with
Risk
Risk Annotations
Annotations
Vertebrates
Amphibians
172
13
8%
Birds
559
129
23 %
Fish
121
36
30 %
Mammals
263
61
23 %
Reptiles
710
52
7%
Total vertebrates
1,825
291
16 %
Total all invertebrates
Grand total

416

11

3%

2,241 species

302 species

13 %
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Table 2. Infectious agents introduced to the US via imports of live, wild animals, 1996-2006.
Infectious Agent
Most Recent
Imported
Known Carrier
Infected
Documentation
Host
Hosts
Animals
Exotic Newcastle’s 1999
Various avian Various avian
Poultry
Disease
species
species
Heartwater

2000

African
tortoise tick

lizards, snakes,
and tortoises

Malignant
Catarrhal Fever
Monkeypox Virus

2002

Ankoli cattle

Wildebeest

2003

Gambian giant
pouched rats
European
rabbit

Gambian giant
pouched rats
European
Rabbit
American bullfrog,
African clawed
frog
American bullfrog

Viral Hemorrhagic
Disease of Rabbits

2005

Chytridiomycosis

2006

American
bullfrog

Ranavirus

2006

American
bullfrog

few other animals) to undergo a quarantine period
or to have proof of veterinary clearance from their
country of origin. This relaxed approach leaves the
US open to “pathogen pollution,” the human-driven
introduction of various infectious agents to new
locations (Table 2). In the current globalized
marketplace, shipping and selling live animals with
minimal regulation magnifies the risks to public
health, animal health, and the economy. Examples
include the 2003-2004 outbreak of SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) traced to the
sprawling, unsanitary live animal markets of
southern China, and monkeypox transmitted by
prairie dogs (Cynomys ludovicianus) sold as pets
that contracted it from Gambian giant pouched rats
(Cricetomys gambianus) imported from Africa by a
US pet distributor.
Now, a particularly virulent strain of avian
influenza (AI), which has turned up in wild-caught
birds imported into Europe, has the potential to
spread to the US. This strain of AI poses a global
pandemic threat should the virus evolve the ability
to spread more efficiently among humans. Millions
of people could die and worldwide economic
damage could be $200 billion or more. The US
import trade in live animals that are potential AI
carriers, if not better regulated, could be a major
factor in a future US outbreak.

Domestic
livestock,
white-tailed
deer
Ruminant
species
Humans,
prairie dogs
European
rabbit

Status in US
Localized,
recurring
outbreaks
Present

Eradicated
Eradicated

Amphibians

Recurring
localized
outbreaks
Present

Amphibians

Present

Global warming is likely to intensify the threats
from harmful species invasions and diseases.
Tropical species will acclimate better and be able to
survive winters that once killed them with cold
temperatures. New invaders may include hot
climate vectors of West Nile virus and other
destructive human and animal pathogens.

BROKEN SCREENS: THE SYSTEM FOR
REGULATING WILD ANIMAL
IMPORTS
The US legal system for live animal imports
generally gives authority to several agencies:
• FWS, under the Lacey Act to prohibit
specified “injurious” animals;
• The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), under the Animal Health Protection
Act and Plant Protection Act, allowing, but
not requiring, APHIS to regulate any animal
that is a pest or disease carrier threatening to
farmed livestock or any plant;
• The Department of Health and Human
Service’s Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), under the Public Health
Service Act, allowing, but not requiring,
CDC to regulate any animal posing a human
disease risk.
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The Lacey Act, a law enacted in 1900 that is in
desperate need of an overhaul, is based on a listing
approach that is excruciatingly slow, offers
minimal coverage and is repeatedly criticized as
outdated and ineffective by experts. The
interagency National Invasive Species Council
proposed a plan in 2001 to fill some of the import
screening gaps, but has failed to follow through on
it. APHIS’s approach to protecting plants and
domesticated livestock from harmful pests is
stronger and more expedient than FWS’s Lacey Act
authority, but it focuses on just a narrow segment of
risks posed by the animal import trade. CDC’s
statutory authority is broad, but is wielded
reactively and minimally. For example, after the
2003 monkeypox outbreak caused by imported
Gambian rats, CDC claimed it would be more
aggressive in protecting public health, but it has not
been.
In summary, FWS and CDC regulatory laws
currently provide the nation a low level of
protection from potentially invasive or “injurious”
species and from species that pose infectious
disease risks to humans, non-livestock animals or
both.

3. Promptly and fully analyze the risks of
continuing to import the 302 species identified by
Defenders and the ISSG as potentially risky.
(Defenders of Wildlife 2007).
4. Aggressively enforce the existing federal
regulation (50 CFR 14.53) that full species
identification must accompany every animal
shipment, and make that information available to
the public.
5. Immediately address the threat of AI by rigidly
enforcing the 30-day quarantine required for all
bird imports and testing every bird.
6. Coordinate and strengthen the federal
government’s role in overseeing and regulating
health risks associated with live animal imports.
7. Appropriate more funds for research on diseases
transmitted by imported animals.
8. Implement the post-import recommendations
adopted by the National Association of State Public
Health Veterinarians and the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists (at www.cste.org/
ps/2003pdfs/03-id-13%20%20final.pdf ).

MENDING THE SCREENS: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

9. Increase funding and staffing for FWS port
inspectors, the country’s first line of protection
from illegal and diseased animal imports.

Defenders urges immediate implementation of
11 policy changes to mend the broken screens at
the US national borders and vastly reduce the risks
of the live animal import trade.

10. Implement an application fee system to pay for
the bulk of the cost of pre-import screening of live
wild animals.

1. Pass new national legislation that clearly directs
FWS, CDC and all other federal agencies to follow
a more risk-averse national standard for wild
animal imports. Defenders recommends the
following language should be the standard:
“Federal agencies shall only allow imports and
interstate commerce in non-native animals that
have been assessed by a responsible federal official
and determined to pose a low likelihood of causing
harm to the environment, the economy, public
health or animal or plant health in the United
States.”

11. Include the animal import industry and other
stakeholders in the development of policy
solutions.
Harmful new invasions and threatening diseases
must be stopped from entering the US. The federal
government could readily enforce stricter controls
because there are only a few dozen major shipping
ports, airports and border crossings in the US where
legal animal imports enter. The 11
recommendations presented here, supported by the
new information on the animal import trade
assembled by Defenders, CCM and the ISSG, show
the way to fixing the nation’s broken screens.

2. Amend the Lacey Act to direct FWS to conduct
detailed pre-import screening of live, wild animals
and give FWS authority to provisionally prohibit
any species for which adequate scientific
information is not available.
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